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Abstract 
Using cointegration and structural vector autoregression (SVAR) techniques this paper investigates the effect of Bank 
Indonesia's (BI) monetary policy on inflation during the post-1997 crisis monetary-targeting period. Our analysis 
suggests that BI's monetary policy does not have systematic impact on the price level, apparently because of unstable 
money demand. Unreliable effects of BI's monetary policy are reflected in frequent and substantial deviations of the 
actual inflation rate from its targeted ranges.
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1. Introduction 
 
Following the Asian financial crisis of 1997, the central banks of Korea, Indonesia, and 
Thailand adopted floating exchange rates, making inflation targeting its new monetary policy 
regime. Most economists believe that an inflation-targeting central bank conducts its monetary 
policy without relying on the relationship between money and inflation. More specifically, the 
central bank controls the expected inflation by adjusting a key policy interest rate (e.g., 
Charoenseang and Manakit, 2007 and Kubo, 2008). 
During 2000:1–2005:6, Bank Indonesia’s (BI) monetary policy regime was de jure inflation 
targeting but de facto monetary targeting. After the Asian crisis, BI first adopted a formal 
monetary-targeting regime in accordance with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) support 
program. After graduating from the IMF program, BI continued employing the base money as its 
monetary policy instrument until June 2005, despite the fact that it switched to inflation 
targeting in January 2000. Fane (2005) suggests that during 2000–2005, BI was not very 
successful in controlling inflation and was in the process of establishing a standard 
inflation-targeting regime similar to the one adopted in Thailand.
1 
This paper empirically investigates the effects of BI’s (de facto) monetary targeting on 
inflation during the post-crisis period. Prior to the investigation, we estimate the Indonesian 
money demand functions by using a cointegration analysis to examine its stability on which the 
efficacy of monetary policy interventions depends. Subsequently, by employing a structural 
vector autoregression (SVAR) methodology, we estimate the impulse response functions to 
determine if and to what extent BI is able to control inflation. The following are the main 
findings of this paper: (1) the estimated Indonesian money demand functions are not stable; and 
(2) BI’s monetary policy does not significantly affect its target variables. These results suggest 
that the effectiveness of BI’s monetary policy is limited. 
 
 
2.  Indonesian money demand functions 
 
During the period under investigation, BI missed its inflation target almost routinely (Figure 
1). The poor performance of BI points to the possibility that the Indonesian money demand 
function is not sufficiently stable. 
Some previous studies discuss the stability of Indonesia’s money demand function. 
Bahmani-Oskooee and Rehman (2005) apply a cointegration methodology to the period 
1972–2000 and judge that the Indonesian money demand functions are stable. James (2005) 
investigates the effects of financial liberalization on the demand for money and concludes that 
there was a stable money demand function for 1983–2000. However, Narayan (2007) analyzes 
                                                        
1 In July 2005, BI implemented a new and enhanced inflation-targeting regime to strengthen price stability by using 
an interest rate adjustment as its operational target (Bank Indonesia, 2005).  2
Indonesian’s money demand for 1970–2005 and finds unstable money demand functions. 
In this section, we use Johansen’s (1995) cointegration procedure to estimate money demand 
in the post-crisis period. More specifically, to investigate the long-run relationship between the 
variables in the standard money demand function, we normalize the cointegrating vector in an 
estimated vector error correction model (VECM). The normalized vector can be represented as 
follows: 
t t t y b r b b m 2 1 0 + + = ,                                           ( 1 )   
where r denotes the 3-month deposit interest rate, a variable representing the return on assets 
alternative to money; y is real industrial production, a proxy for real income; and m represents 
real money balances based on M0,  M1, and M2 deflated by the consumer price index. In 
addition, we follow recent studies (e.g., Bahmani-Oskooee and Rehman, 2005) and add the 
exchange rate, which appears to be relevant in Indonesia: 
  t t t t f b y b r b b m 3 2 1 0 + + + = .                                      ( 2 )  
In the above, f represents the nominal exchange rate defined as the price of a US dollar in 
Indonesian Rupiah. Accordingly, an increase in f denotes depreciation in the Rupiah. 
In this and the next sections, all the data are monthly and refer to 1999:1-2005:6. These data 
were extracted from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics (IFS), except for those on 
industrial production that were obtained from BPS-Statistics Indonesia’s Web site. With the 
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Figure 1. Inflation rates and target ranges in Indonesia 
Source: Bank Indonesia  3
results of unit root tests, all variables appear to be I(1).
2 
First, the optimal lag length of the unrestricted vector autoregression model is set at k in each 
case (Table 2 and 3), by referring to the sequential modified likelihood ratio test. Hence, the lag 
length for the first differenced series in the VECM is k–1. Next, in order to investigate the 
number of cointegrating vectors, we apply Johansen’s (1988) cointegration test by using trace 
and max-eigen statistics.
3 
Tables 2 and 3 present the estimated long-run relationships among the variables in (1) and (2). 
                                                        
2 See  Table  1. 
Table 2
Long-run relationships and the money demand function: m t= b 0+ b 1r t+ b 2y t
M0 k = 6 24.324 16.673 –––
M1 k = 6 45.149 ** 28.206 ** 5.660 -1.365 0.380
(0.27) (0.15)
[ -5.09] [2.52]
M2 k = 6 33.422 ** 22.641 ** 7.189 0.587 0.336
(0.15) (0.08)
[3.98] [3.97]
Note: The standard errors are in parentheses; the t-values are in square brackets.
 ** denotes the rejection of the null hypothesis (the cointegration rank is none) at the 5% level of significance.
White heteroscedasticity test (no cross term) = 79.34%   Normality test (Jarque-Bera) = 5.54%
White heteroscedasticity test (no cross term) = 19.55%   Normality test (Jarque-Bera) = 0.63%
b 1 b 2 m
Trace
statistic




Unit root test statistics
r y M0 M1 M2 rf
ADF -2.182 (8) -1.391 (2) -1.228 (1) -2.169 (1) -3.221 (0)** -1.487 (2)
KPSS 0.765 (6)** 1.176 (6)** 1.006 (6)** 1.051 (6)** 0.355 (6)* 0.617 (6)**
  ∆r  ∆y  ∆M0   ∆M1   ∆M2   ∆rf
ADF -4.955 (7)** -7.825 (3)** -13.312 (0)** -12.464 (0)** -6.179 (2)** -7.527 (1)**
KPSS 0.441 (6)* 0.159 (11) 0.135 (10) 0.250 (8) 0.299 (7) 0.110 (13)
Note: The numbers in parentheses represent the optimal lag length chosen by SBIC.
** denotes the rejection of the null hypothesis of the unit roots for the ADF or of the stationarity for the
KPSS at the 5% level of significance.
* denotes the rejection of the null hypothesis of the unit roots for the ADF or of the stationarity for the
KPSS at the 10%  level of significance. 4
Although at least one cointegrating vector was detected for each of these monetary aggregates, 
the M0-based equation in Table 2 appears not to have the long-run relationship between the 
variables. In addition, we provide residuals analysis, such as White’s heteroscedasticity test and 
the Jarque-Bera normality test, to validate the adequacy of the trace and max-eigen statistics. 
The null hypotheses of no heteroscedasticity and/or that of no normality are rejected in 
approximately every case.
4 Moreover, in Tables 2 and 3, some of the estimated equations are 
not consistent with standard monetary theory. Although the real money demand is positively 
related to industrial production in every case, the estimated coefficient on the interest rate is 
statistically significant and positive for the equations for M2 (in Table 2) and M0 (in Table 3).
5 
Thus, the Indonesian money demand function appears not to be stable. These results suggest that 




3.  Transmission mechanism of monetary policy 
 
To measure the dynamic responses of the Indonesian macroeconomic variables to a monetary 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
3  A deterministic constant is allowed in the cointegrating space. 
4  The only exception is the M1-based equation in Table 2. 
5  Either a positive or negative sign for b3 seems to be relevant because of the respective assumptions (for details, 
see Bahmani-Oskooee and Pourheydarian, 1990). 
Table 3
Long-run relationships and the money demand function: m t= b 0+ b 1r t+ b 2y t+ b 3f t
M0 k = 6 66.375 ** 32.215 ** 15.811 32.628 9.456 -6.381
(6.78) (2.50) (1.83)
[4.81] [3.78] [ -3.49]
M1 k = 7 65.266 ** 36.138 ** 1.533 -2.302 0.527 0.397
(0.35) (0.13) (0.09)
[ -6.60] [4.10] [4.37]
M2 k = 6 85.219 ** 42.557 ** 5.463 -0.711 0.103 0.332
(0.11) (0.04) (0.03)
[ -6.60] [2.32] [10.72]
Note: The standard errors are in parentheses; the t-values are in square brackets.
 ** denotes the rejection of the null hypothesis (the cointegration rank is none) at the 5% level of significance.
White heteroscedasticity test (no cross term) = 64.88%   Normality test (Jarque-Bera) = 0.00%
White heteroscedasticity test (no cross term) = 85.03%   Normality test (Jarque-Bera) = 0.04%
White heteroscedasticity test (no cross term) = 1.86%   Normality test (Jarque-Bera) = 0.08%
b 1 b 3 m
Trace
statistic
b 0 b 2 lag (k)
Max-Eigen
statistic 5
policy shock, we estimate a 5-variable SVAR
6  model as follows: 
t n t i t e x L A Bx + + = − ) ( µ ,                                              (3) 
where matrix B may be restricted by economic theory; µ is a 5-dimensional vector of constants; 
xt is a 5-dimensional vector of the relevant variables in time; Ai is a 5ʷ5 matrix of coefficients 
in the lag operator L; and et is a 5-dimensional vector of error terms with zero means and 
covariance matrix Σe. 
The variables included in the SVAR model are consumer price index (p), industrial production 
(y), interbank call money rate (i),
7 base money aggregate (M), and nominal exchange rate 
expressed in terms of Indonesian Rupiah per US dollar (f). The last variable is included since the 
1998 central banking law stipulates that BI pursues both price and exchange rate stability. By 
referring to the final predict error statistics, the optimal lag length is set at 2. As noted before, all 
variables other than the interest rate are expressed in natural logarithms. 
We first estimate the impulse response functions using a Choleski decomposition
8 with the 
ordering [p, y, i, M, f] to identify the impact of monetary policy innovation. Nevertheless, some 
of the impulse response functions do not permit a meaningful interpretation. Thus, we pursue an 
alternative to the Choleski decomposition, imposing non-recursive zero restrictions
9 on the 
contemporaneous structural parameters. 
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µ .                   ( 4 )  
 
The first and second rows in matrix B represent the real sector. The third row corresponds to the 
monetary policy rule. It is assumed that BI sets the interest rate after observing the current base 
monetary and the exchange rate. This assumption is consistent with BI’s monetary policy 
instrument and objective. The fourth row corresponds to the money demand equation in (1). The 
fifth row assumes that the exchange rate is contemporaneously exogenous to all the variables in 
the model. With these restrictions, we have obtained the following five relationships: 
                                                        
6  If cointegration is present and not imposed in the estimation, there can be substantial biases in the impulse 
response functions (Mitchell, 2000). However, we use the level variables to analyze the short-run restrictions in 
accordance with the recent SVAR literature (e.g., Christiano et al., 1999) and to investigate the relationships among 
the contemporaneous innovations. 
7  In this section, we use the interbank call money rate—and not the 3-month deposit rate—as a suitable proxy for 
the monetary policy. 
8  See, for example, Sims (1980) and Christiano et al. (1999). 
9  See, for example, Sims (1986), Christiano et al. (1999), and Kim and Roubini (2000).  6
çç  pt t e p =                                   ç                 ( 5 )  
yt t t e p y + − = 324 . 0                                              ( 6 )  
it t t t e f M i + + = 050 . 0 194 . 1                                      ( 7 )  
Mt t t t t e i y p M + − + = 712 . 3 324 . 0 977 . 3                             ( 8 )  
ft t e f =                                                      ( 9 )  
In the above, eit can be regarded as a monetary policy shock. Accordingly, (7) and (8) are the 
monetary policy reaction function and the money demand function, respectively. Price and 
exchange rate innovations in (5) and (9) are autonomous.
10  They should be predetermined as the 
policy objective. 
Figure 2 presents the estimated responses to a contractionary monetary policy shock (a 
positive one-standard-deviation innovation to the interbank call money rate). The solid lines 
represent the point estimates of the impulse responses, while the dashed lines denote their 95% 
confidence interval. The horizontal axis measures the number of months following the shock. 
We observe that after initially rising in response to the innovation, the interbank call money rate 
begins to fall and returns to the initial level after 6 months. Meanwhile, the base money falls 
sharply and exhibits a peak decline in the first month. Industrial production reaches its lowest 
point after 3 months. The consumer price declines gradually and reaches the nadir in 18 months 
following the shock. This result implies that the effect of the monetary policy shock is not 
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Figure 2. Impulse responses to a monetary policy shock, 1999:1–2005:6  7
entirely felt on the economy in BI’s target horizon, which is reset every year. Finally, the 
exchange rate falls and reaches the lowest point after 8 months. 
Although the previous result suggests that BI apparently has a monetary transmission 
mechanism to affect the policy objective variables, the declines in the consumer price and 
exchange rate are not statistically significant.
11 This result suggests that BI’s influence on its 





In this paper, we investigate the stability and consistency of the Indonesian money demand 
function and the effectiveness of BI’s monetary policy using cointegration and SVAR techniques. 
The estimated money demand functions are not stable, nor does the monetary policy seem to 
have quantitatively significant effect on the price level. These findings suggest that BI’s lever 
over the price level is at best limited, consistent with the deviations from the inflation target 
ranges observed in Indonesia almost annually. 
On the basis of the empirical results, we conclude that the relationships between money and 
inflation as well as output in Indonesia are not sufficiently stable. Therefore, opting for a 




                                                        
11  We expand the sample period for each one-month period, including the period after BI began to use the interest 
rate adjustment as its operational target. It is not until 2005:12 that the statistically significant effect on price is 
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Figure 3. Impulse responses to a monetary policy shock, 1999:1–2005:12.
Note: The optimal lag length is set at 2.  8
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